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a b s t r a c t
Recently, Herranz presented an identity-based ring signature scheme featuring signer
verifiability where a signer can prove that he or she is the real signer by releasing an
authorship proof. In this paper we show that this scheme is vulnerable to a key recovery
attack in which a user’s secret signing key can be efficiently recovered through the use
of two known ring signatures and their corresponding authorship proofs. In addition,
we present a simple method to fix this security vulnerability by slightly modifying the
authorship proof. Our modified scheme simplifies the original scheme and improves
performance. To show that the modified scheme is unforgeable, we define two types
of unforgeability notions for both signatures and authorship proofs. In these notions an
adversary has opening capability to confirm the real signers of ring signatures and thus can
manipulate authorship proofs in an adaptiveway.We then prove that ourmodified scheme
is secure in terms of these unforgeability notions.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
To achieve both signer ambiguity and message authentication properly for applications treating user-sensitive
information, ring signature (RS) schemes have been constructed [8,3]. Using a list or a ring of arbitrary signers, a signer
can compute a signature associated with the ring and hide himself or herself in the ring. From a valid RS, a verifier can be
convinced that the signature is generated by one of the ring members, but cannot be aware of the exact signer. An identity-
based RS (IBRS) scheme is an RS scheme combined with identity-based cryptography [10], where (certificate-based) public
key management procedures are simplified such that an arbitrary public string such as an e-mail address may be used as a
public verification key [11].
While it is desirable that a signer remains anonymous for some applications, the signer needs to prove origination of a
signature in times of acquiring benefits, or as otherwise necessary. For example, consider the case of an online auction. A
participant may use an IBRS scheme for anonymity but will need to convince a verifier that he or she really submitted the
winning bid or contract price. By releasing an authorship proof of a ring signature, IBRS schemes can achieve convertibility
or signer verifiability [9,6] that a signer can convert his or her ring signature into an ordinary signature. The authorship proof
explicitly guarantees the identity of the real signer. For convenience an IBRS scheme with signer verifiability is called an
SV-IBRS scheme throughout the rest of this paper.
An SV-IBRS schememust achieve basic security notions, such as existential unforgeability and robustness to key recovery
attacks, so that only the members of a ring can generate valid signatures associated with the ring. These security notions
should be achieved under reasonable attack environments. In order to prove and confirm a real signer, an SV-IBRS scheme
makes use of two additional algorithms, opening and convincing. Basically, the scheme must guarantee that no useful
information leaks outwhenusing these algorithms. Furthermore, it should be impossible for colluding adversaries to deceive
a verifier regarding the origination of a signature with a forged authorship proof.
∗ Tel.: +82 18 741 9526.
E-mail addresses: videmot@korea.ac.kr, videmot@etri.re.kr.
0304-3975/$ – see front matter© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2010.11.024
J.Y. Hwang / Theoretical Computer Science 412 (2011) 796–804 797
Recently, a novel SV-IBRS scheme extending the Guillou-Quisquater signature scheme [2] was proposed and a formal
security proof for the scheme was presented in [3]. In contrast to other works which presents only intuitive solutions and
informal security analysis [5,6], [3] presents a formal treatment for secure opening and convincing algorithms of a ring
signature scheme. Unfortunately, in this paper, we show that the SV-IBRS scheme is vulnerable to a key recovery attack; that
is, the secret signing key of a user can be efficiently computed by using two known ring signatures and their corresponding
authorship proofs. To remedy this security problem,we slightlymodify the original IBRS schemeby removing one element in
the original authorship proof. Themodified SV-IBRS scheme becomes simpler than the original scheme and offers improved
computation overhead.
In order to show that our modified scheme is unforgeable, we first formally define two types of unforgeability notions
for an SV-IBRS scheme. Intuitively, the first notion captures normal existential unforgeability of a ring signature and the
second captures unforgeability of an authorship proof. For the second notion we consider two kinds of forgers. The first
kind of forger aims to forge both a signature and its corresponding authorship proof for a target signer without knowledge
of the private key of the signer. The second kind of forger possesses the private key of the real signer and tries to forge
an authorship proof for a given signature. Once unforgeability against the second kind of forger is achieved, all signatures
generated with a private key remain anonymous even under exposure of the private key. In the security notions described
above, an adversary is allowed to access the opening oracle to obtain an authorship proof of a ring signature and confirm
the real signer of the ring signature in an adaptive way. Obviously, because of the opening property, the security notions of
an SV-IBRS scheme are intrinsically different from those of an ordinary IBRS. We prove that our modified scheme is secure
in terms of these two unforgeability notions.
Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2we review the recently proposed IBRS scheme
with signer verifiability [3]. In Section 3we show that the scheme is vulnerable to a key recovery attack. In Section 4we first
propose a simple modification to fix the security problem, and then define two unforgeability notions. Finally we prove that
the modified scheme is secure with respect to these notions. We conclude in Section 5.
2. A review of Herranz’s SV-IBRS scheme
We will briefly review the SV-IBRS scheme from [3]. Let φ(·) be Euler’s totient function, that is, φ(Nˆ) = (p1 − 1)
pk1−11 · · · (pr − 1)pkr−1r for Nˆ = pk11 · · · pkrr , where r , k1, . . . , kr are positive integers and p1, . . . , pr are distinct primes.
Setup: On input of a security parameter k, the master entity generates two random k-bit prime numbers p and q, and
computes N = pq. For some fixed parameter ℓ, the master entity picks at random a prime e satisfying 2ℓ < e < 2ℓ+1
and gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1, and computes d = e−1 mod φ(N) where φ(N) = (p − 1)(q − 1). In addition, the master en-
tity picks two hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗N and H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}ℓ. The set of public system parameters is
params = (k, ℓ,N, e,H1,H2) and its corresponding master secret key is msk = (p, q, d).
Extract: When a user with identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ requests a secret key, the master entity computes SK = H1(ID)d mod N .
The secret key SK is sent to the user through a secure channel. The user then verifies if the received secret key is consistent
by checking if SK e = H1(ID)mod N .
Ring Signature Generation: To sign a messageM ∈ {0, 1}∗ on behalf of a ring of identities,U = {ID1, . . . , IDn}, a user with
identity IDs ∈ U and secret key SKs proceeds as follows:
1. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , s − 1, s + 1, . . . , n}, pick Ai ∈ Z∗N uniformly at random, pairwise different. Compute Ri = Aei mod N
and hi = H2(U,M, IDi, Ri) for all i ≠ s.
2. Pick A ∈ Z∗N at random.
3. Compute Rs = Ae ·∏ni=1,i≠s H1(IDi)−hi mod N . If Rs = 1 mod N or Rs = Ri for some i ≠ s, then go to step 2.
4. Compute hs = H2(U,M, IDs, Rs).
5. Compute σ = SK hss · A ·
∏n
i=1,i≠s Ai mod N .
6. The signature on (M,U) isΘ = (U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ ).
Ring Signature Verification: For the validity of a signature, check if hi = H2(U,M, IDi, Ri) for i = 1, . . . , n and
σ e =
n∏
i=1
Ri · H1(IDi)hi mod N.
Output 1 if all the equalities hold, and 0 otherwise.
Opening: Assume that a signer with identity IDs has correctly followed the Ring Signature Generation algorithm to
generate a ring signature Θ = (U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ ) where U = {ID1, . . . , IDn}. When the signer wants to
reveal his or her identity as the real author of the signature, he or she broadcasts the identity IDs and an authorship proof
cv-pf = {A, {Ai}i≠s}.
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Convincing: A verifier checks the validity of the authorship of a signature Θ by checking Rj
?= Aej mod N for j =
1, . . . , n, (j ≠ s) and Ae ?= Rs ·∏i≠s H1(IDi)hi mod N . Output 1 if all the equalities hold, and 0 otherwise.
3. Vulnerabilities in the SV-IBRS scheme
In this section we show that the above scheme is vulnerable to a key recovery attack; that is, a secret signing key of a
signer can be easily computed using two known ring signatures and their corresponding authorship proofs. Additionally,
we discuss why this security problem occurs.
3.1. A key recovery attack on the scheme
In our attack scenario, we assume that an adversary F randomly selects a target identity ID, and two rings U1 =
{ID1, . . . , IDn}, U2 = {ID′1, . . . , ID′m} of arbitrary members including ID, and two random messages M1,M2 ∈ {0, 1}∗. As-
sume that ID = IDs1 ∈ U1 and ID = ID′s2 ∈ U2 and the secret signing key for ID is SK = SKs1 = SKs2 . Then the adversary
is assumed to obtain two valid signatures Θk on (Uk,Mk) and their corresponding authorship proofs, cv-pfk for k = 1, 2,
respectively. Note that this is a typical and practical attack environment in which to measure the security of a signature
scheme. Let the given valid signatures and their corresponding authorship proofs be
Θ1 = (U1,M1, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ1), cv-pf1 = {A, {Aj}j≠s1}, and
Θ2 = (U2,M2, R′1, . . . , R′m, h′1, . . . , h′m, σ2), cv-pf2 = {A′, {A′i}i≠s2},
where hj = H2(U1,M1, IDj, Rj) for j = 1, . . . , n, and h′i = H2(U2,M2, ID′i, R′i) for i = 1, . . . ,m.
By assumption, the signatures and the proofs have correct forms, that is,
Rs1 = Ae
∏n
j=1,j≠s1 H1(IDj)
−hj (mod N) and Rj = Aej (mod N) for j = 1, . . . , n (j ≠ s1), and σ1 = SK
hs1
s1 ·A ·
∏n
j=1,j≠s1 Aj
(mod N), and
Rs2 = A′e
∏m
i=1,i≠s2 H1(ID
′
i)
−h′i (mod N) and R′i = A′ei (mod N) for i = 1, . . . ,m (i ≠ s2), and σ2 = SK
h′s2
s2 · A′ ·∏m
i=1,i≠s2 A
′
i (mod N).
Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, the adversary finds two integers α1 and α2 such that hs1α1+h′s2α2 = 1. In addition,
the adversary computes η1 = σ1 · (A ·∏nj=1,j≠s1 Aj)−1 (mod N) and η2 = σ2 · (A′ ·∏mi=1,i≠s2 A′i)−1 (mod N), and then
SK = ηα11 ηα22 (mod N). Note that by assumption, SKs1 = SK = SKs2 .
Now we compute the probability that the adversary succeeds in the presented attack. It is well known [7] that the
probability that two random numbers are relatively prime is 6/π2 ≈ 0.6. We can apply this fact to our case. Due to the
random hash function H2, we can assume that hs1 = H2(U1,M1, IDs1 , Rs1) and h′s2 = H2(U2,M2, ID′s2 , R′s2) are distributed
uniformly at random, and so hs1 and h
′
s2 are relatively prime with probability 6/π
2 ≈ 0.6. Therefore we can expect
that the adversary will find two integers α1, α2 such that hs1α1 + h′s2α2 = 1, and thus will compute the secret key
SK = SK hs1α1+h′s2α2 = ηα11 ηα22 (mod N)within two trials with high probability.
3.2. Discussion
The main idea of the above key recovery attack is to make use of ring signatures and their corresponding authorship
proofs. This attack is reasonable because a signer will release authorship proofs of ring signatures whenever he proves the
real signer of the signatures, and an adversary may easily obtain these authorship proofs. Neither the unforgeability model
nor the security proof of the model in [3] considers this malicious use of authorship proofs. In order to reflect an adversary’s
capabilities precisely and guarantee sufficient robustness under publicity of authorship proofs, the unforgeability model
must include opening oracle queries which provide an adversary with authorship proofs.
The security proofs of the SV-IBRS scheme presented in [3] are not correct in the unforgeability model with the opening
oracle queries. The opening algorithm of the SV-IBRS scheme outputs an authorship proof cv-pf = {A, {A1, . . . , As−1,
As+1, . . . , An}} for a ring signature Θ = (U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ ) if this signature Θ was generated by IDs ∈ U =
{ID1, . . . , IDn}. Refer to Section 2 formore details. Thus, the authorship proofmust includeA such thatAe ?= Rs ·∏i≠s H1(IDi)hi
(mod N). It is intractable to simulate this opening algorithm in the security proofs (described in [3]), because the simulation
of signature generation is performed without knowledge of A and so a response to an opening query, that is, an authorship
proof cannot include A. So the original opening and convincing algorithms must be properly modified.
4. Modification
To resolve the previous security problem one may use an idea from [8,9] where the Ai’s, which are generated for non-
signers of a ring for a ring signature, are set to be hash outputs of H2 and a collection of pre-images of the hash outputs are
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used for an authorship proof. In this section, instead of using the idea, we slightly modify the original Herranz’s SV-IBRS
scheme not only to fix this security problem but also to improve performance.
4.1. Construction
The modified SV-IBRS scheme is described as follows.
Setup, Extract, Ring Signature Generation, and Ring Signature Verification algorithms are the same as those of Herranz’s
scheme described in Section 2.
Opening: Assume that a signer with identity IDs has honestly followed the Ring Signature Generation algorithm to
generate a ring signature Θ = (U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ ). When the signer wants to reveal his or her identity
as the real signer of the signature, he or she broadcasts the identity IDs and a convincing authorship proof cv-pf =
(s, A1, . . . , As−1, As+1, . . . , An).
Convincing: A verifier confirms the validity of the authorship of a given signature Θ = (U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ )
by checking Rj = Aej mod N for j = 1, . . . , n, (j ≠ s).
Note that the modified Opening and Convincing algorithms are simpler than those of the original scheme. Since the
modified Opening algorithm outputs only an index, instead of a group element A, to indicate a real signer, the modified
authorship proof is shorter by almost one element of Z∗N . Furthermore, the modified Convincing algorithm does not
perform the equality test, Ae ?= Rs ·∏i≠s H1(IDi)hi mod N . Next, we prove that the modified scheme is secure, despite this
simplification.
4.2. Unforgeability properties for an SV-IBRS scheme
To prove that the modified scheme is unforgeable, we first formally define two kinds of unforgeability notions for an
SV-IBRS schemewhere an adversary is able to access the opening oracle. The first notion is unforgeability of a ring signature,
that is, it should be computationally impossible for a malicious party who is not a member of a ring to generate a signature
associated with the ring, even if opening capability is given to that party. This notion is simply referred to as unforgeability
in this paper because it is similar to the standard notion of unforgeability for an ordinary IBRS scheme. The second notion
captures unforgeability with respect to ‘‘signer verifiability", i.e., unforgeability of an authorship proof. In order to treat the
second notion more precisely, we consider two security requirements.1 First, it must be computationally impossible for an
adversary to generate both a signer’s ring signature and its corresponding proof without knowing the private signing key of
the signer. Second, it must be computationally impossible for an adversary to generate an authorship proof for a given ring
signature even if the adversary is aware of the actual signing key. These notions are formally modeled in two games.
Unforgeability. An SV-IBRS scheme, Σ = (Setup, Extract, Ring Signature Generation, Ring Signature Verification,
Opening, Convincing) is existentially unforgeable under the chosen message-identity attack if any probabilistic polynomial-
time (PPT) adversary has a negligible advantage in the following game.
Initially, a challenger C sets up parameters running the Setup algorithm ofΣ for a given security parameter. Public pa-
rameters params are given to an adversaryF . The challenger provides the adversary with an attack environment using the
following oracle queries.
Queries: The adversary F can make Extract, Ring-sign, Opening, and Hash oracle queries. The queries can be issued
in an adaptive way, i.e., a query may depend on the answers to the previous queries.
• Extract ⟨ID⟩. The challenger runs theExtract algorithm to obtain a private key SKID corresponding to ID and then returns
SKID.• Ring-sign ⟨ID′j,U′,M ′⟩. Assume that ID′j ∈ U′. The challenger obtains the private key SKID′j corresponding to ID′j . He
or she runs the Ring Signature Generation algorithm with the private key SKID′j and the given messageM
′ as input, and
then obtains a signatureΘ ′. The challenger returnsΘ ′.
• Opening ⟨U′,M ′,Θ ′⟩. Assume thatΘ ′ has been generated by aRing-sign query. After running theOpening algorithm
with the given signatureΘ ′ and the messageM ′, the challenger then returns the resulting authorship proof cv-pf.
• Hash. If some hash functions, which are assumed to behave as random oracles [1], are used in the security proof then
the challenger returns consistent and totally random hash values.
Forgery: Finally, the adversary F outputs a tuple (U,M,Θ). We say that F succeeds if the following conditions hold.
- Θ is valid, that is, the Ring Signature Verification algorithm taking as input (params,U,M,Θ) outputs 1.
1 A similar idea is informally described in [3].
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- For any IDi ∈ U, the identity IDi has not been queried to the Extract oracle.
- For any IDi ∈ U, the signatureΘ has not been generated from querying ⟨IDi,U,M⟩ to Ring-sign oracle.
The advantage of the adversary F is defined as AdvEUF-CMIAF ,SV−IBRS(k) = Pr[SuccF ], where SuccF denotes the success of F in the
above game.
SV-Unforgeability. For SV-unforgeability of an SV-IBRS scheme we define two games called GameSVU-I and GameSVU-II. An
SV-IBRS scheme,Σ = (Setup, Extract, Ring Signature Generation, Ring Signature Verification, Opening, Convincing) is
existentially SV-unforgeable under the chosen message-identity attack if any PPT adversary has a negligible advantage in each
of the games.
GameSVU-I. Initially, a challenger C sets up parameters running the Setup of Σ for a given security parameter. Public pa-
rameters params are given to an adversaryFI . The challenger provides the adversary with an attack environment using the
following oracle queries.
Queries: The adversary FI makes Extract, Ring-sign, Opening, and Hash oracle queries. The queries can be issued in
an adaptive way, i.e., a query may depend on the answers to the previous queries.
• Extract ⟨ID⟩. After running the Extract algorithm with ID, the challenger then returns the corresponding private key
SKID.• Ring-sign ⟨ID′j,U′,M ′⟩. Assume that ID′j ∈ U′. The challenger runs the Ring Signature Generation algorithmwith the
private key SKID′j and the given messageM
′, and then obtains a signatureΘ ′. The challenger returnsΘ ′.
• Opening ⟨U′,M ′,Θ ′⟩. Assume that Θ ′ has been generated by a Ring-sign query. The challenger runs the Opening
algorithm with the given signature Θ ′ and the given message M ′, and then obtains an authorship proof cv-pf. The
challenger returns the proof.
• Hash. If the scheme uses some hash function H , which is assumed to behave as a random oracle [1] in the security proof,
then the challenger returns consistent and totally random hash values.
Forgery: The adversary F outputs a tuple (IDs,U,M,Θ, cv-pf), where IDs ∈ U. We say that F succeeds if the following
conditions hold.
- Both the signature Θ and the authorship proof cv-pf are valid, i.e., the Ring Signature Verification algorithm taking as
input (params,U,M ,Θ) and the Convincing algorithm taking as input (params,U,M,Θ, IDs, cv-pf) both output 1.
- ⟨IDs⟩ has not been queried to the Extract oracle.
- ⟨U,M,Θ⟩ has not been queried to the Opening oracle.
The advantage of the adversary is defined as AdvsvEUF-I-CMIAFI ,SV−IBRS (k) = Pr[SuccFI ], where SuccFI denotes the success of FI in the
above game.
GameSVU-II. Initially, a challenger C sets up parameters running the Setup algorithm of Σ for a given security parameter.
Public parameters params are given to an adversary FII . We assume that all private keys are given to the adversary. The
challenger provides the adversary with an attack environment using the following oracle queries.
Queries: The adversaryFII makes Ring-sign, Opening, and Hash oracle queries. The queries can be issued in an adaptive
way, i.e., a query may depend on the answers to the previous queries.
• Ring-sign ⟨ID′j,U′,M ′⟩. Assume that ID′j ∈ U′. The challenger obtains the private key SKID′j corresponding to the
identity ID′j , runs the Ring Signature Generation algorithmwith the private key SKID′j and the givenmessageM
′ as input,
and then obtains a signatureΘ ′. The challenger returnsΘ ′.
• Opening ⟨U′,M ′,Θ ′⟩. Assume that Θ ′ has been generated by a Ring-sign query. The challenger runs the Opening
algorithm with the given signature Θ ′ and the given message M ′ as input, and then obtains an authorship proof cv-pf.
The challenger returns the proof.
• Hash. If the scheme uses some hash function H , which is assumed to behave as a random oracle [1] in the security proof,
then the challenger returns consistent and random hash values.
Challenge: When the adversary FII outputs (M∗,U∗, ID ∈ U∗) as a challenge, the challenger C returns a signatureΘ that
is generated with the private signing key skID.
Forgery: The adversary FII outputs a tuple (IDs,Θ∗, cv-pf) where IDs ∈ U∗. We say that FII succeeds if the following
conditions hold.
- The authorship proof cv-pf is valid, i.e., the Convincing algorithm taking as input (params,U∗,M∗,Θ∗, IDs, cv-pf)
outputs 1.
- ⟨U∗,M∗,Θ∗⟩ has not been queried to the Opening oracle.
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The advantage of the adversary FII is defined as AdvsvEUF-II-CMIAFII ,SV−IBRS (k) = Pr[SuccFII ], where SuccFII denotes the success of FII
in the above game.
4.3. Security proofs
Before presenting security proofs, we will review the RSA problem [3] on which the security of our modified scheme
relies. Let N = pq, where p and q are two k-bit prime numbers. Let e be a random prime number such that the size of e is
greater than 2ℓ for some fixed parameter ℓ and gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1. Let y be a random element in Z∗N . The RSA problem is to
compute z satisfying ze = y (mod N) for given (N, e, y).
Theorem 1. The constructed SV-IBRS scheme above is existentially unforgeable under the hardness of the RSA problem in the
random oracle model.
Proof. It is easy to see that this theorem can be proved using the proof details of Theorem 4 in [3] while adding a simple
simulation for Opening oracle queries. In this proof, consider an identity IDs satisfying with H1(IDs) = yxes (mod N),
where xs is randomly picked from Z∗N and y is in a given RSA problem. To generate a signature Θ the signature simulation
method of the proof picks Ai ∈ Z∗N uniformly at random and computes Ri = Aei (mod N) for all i = 1, . . . , s − 1, s +
1, . . . , n′, where s is the index of the real signer. Note that an output of the Opening algorithm of the proposed scheme
with the signature Θ = (U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ ) consists of Aj (=Re−1j mod N) for j = 1, . . . , n(j ≠ s). Hence, the
Opening⟨U,M,Θ⟩ query can be correctly answered using A1, . . . , As−1, As+1, . . . , An′ which were picked in the signature
simulation of the proof. So the simulation for Opening oracle queries can be easily done. 
Theorem 2. The constructed SV-IBRS scheme above is existentially SV-unforgeable under the hardness of the RSA problem in the
random oracle model.
This theorem can be directly proved from the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1. An adversary FI has a negligible advantage in the first game for SV-unforgeability in Section 4.2
Proof. In the security proof we will construct an efficient solver S to the RSA problem using an adversary FI who attacks
the proposed SV-IBRS scheme as a sub-routine. Let (N, e, y) be an instance of the RSA problem. The goal of S is to compute
z ∈ Z∗N such that ze = y (mod N). The solver S will simulate an attack environment for the adversary through oracle
queries. We assume that FI ’s hash queries are never repeated. Let Q1, Q2, Qe, and Qs be the numbers of H1, H2, Extract,
and Ring-sign queries issued by the adversary, respectively. We assume that all ring signatures queried to the Opening
oracle are generated by the Ring-Sign oracle. Note that an adversary would already know the authorship proof of a ring
signature if he or she generated the ring signature by himself using the private signing key of a corrupted user.
S responds to oracle queries as follows.
• Queries to the H2 random hash oracle. These queries are trivially answered, that is, for an oracle query, pick c from {0, 1}ℓ
uniformly at random and then return c.
• Queries to the H1 random hash oracle. For an H1⟨ID⟩ oracle query, H1(ID) is defined by yxe mod N with probability µ and
xe mod N with probability 1−µ, whereµ = (5/6)1/Qe and x is chosen from Z∗N uniformly at random. For more details, refer
to [3]. Return the defined H1(ID).
• Queries to the Extract oracle. For an Extract⟨ID⟩ query, if an answer to H1(ID) query has not been defined then ask an
H1(ID) query. If H1(ID) = xe mod N for some x ∈ Z∗N then return x. Otherwise, abort the simulation.•Queries to the Ring-sign oracle. First, S picksα from {1, . . . ,Qs} uniformly. For a Ring-sign ⟨ID,U,M⟩ query, proceed
as follows. Assume that ID ∈ U = {ID1, . . . , IDn} and ID = IDs for some s ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let Coinδ be a δ-biased coin which
outputs 1 with probability δ and 0 with probability 1− δ. Assume that δ = 1/2.
- On the αth query, toss Coinδ .
(1) If Coinδ = 1 then proceed as follows. For each i = 1, . . . , n (i ≠ s), pick Ai ∈ Z∗N uniformly at random, pairwise
different, and compute Ri = yAei mod N and also hi = H2(U,M, IDi, Ri) by querying ⟨U,M, IDi, Ri⟩ to the H2 oracle.
Pick hs ∈ {0, 1}ℓ and σ ∈ Z∗N uniformly at random. Compute Rs = σ e · H1(IDs)−hs ·
∏n
i=1,i≠s(R
−1
i · H1(IDi)−hi)mod N .
Falsify the random oracle H2 by setting hs = H2(U,M, IDs, Rs). ReturnΘ = (U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ ).
(2) Else if Coinδ = 0 then generate a signature as other queries below and return it.
- On the other queries, proceed as follows.
(1) For identity ID with H1(ID) = yxe mod N , return a signature as follows. For all i = 1, . . . , n (i ≠ s), pick Ai ∈ Z∗N
uniformly at random, pairwise different, and compute Ri = Aei mod N . Let hi be a hash value that is obtained
from an H2 query, i.e., hi ← H2(U,M, IDi, Ri) for i ≠ s. Pick random σ ∈ Z∗N and hs ∈ {0, 1}ℓ. Compute
Rs = (σ )e · H1(IDs)−hs ·∏ni=1,i≠s(R−1i H1(IDi)−hi)mod N . Define hs as the output of H2(U,M, IDs (=ID), Rs). Finally,
return the signatureΘ = (U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ ).
(2) For identity IDwith H1(ID) = xe mod N , using the corresponding private key x, generate a signature according to the
correct signing procedure, and then return the signature.
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• Queries to the Opening oracle. For an Opening ⟨ID,U,M,Θ⟩ query, proceed as follows. Assume that ID = IDs ∈ U =
{ID1, . . . , IDn}.
- IfΘ has been generated from the αth Ring-sign query with Coinδ = 1 then abort.
- Otherwise, proceed as follows.
(1) For identity IDwith H1(ID) = xe mod N , an answer can be obviously returned becauseΘ can be generated with the
signing key x according to the defined signing procedure.
(2) For identity ID with H1(ID) = yxe mod N , return an authorship proof cv-pf = (s, A1, . . . , As−1, As+1, . . . , An) using
Ai’s (i = 1, . . . , n(i ≠ s)) that are generated in the presented simulation of Ring-sign. The authorship proof is valid
because Ai ∈ Z∗N with Ri = Aei mod N is well defined in the simulation.
Assume that the adversary FI finally outputs (IDt ,U,M,Θ, cv-pf) where IDt ∈ U = {ID1, . . . , IDt , . . . , IDn|n ≥ 2},
Θ = (U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ ), cv-pf = (t, A′1, . . . , A′t−1, A′t+1, . . . , A′n), and A′je = Rj (mod N) for j = 1, . . . , t −
1, t + 1, . . . , n.
The above simulation is perfect if no abortion occurs. It is obvious that hash outputs are distributed uniformly at random.
If abortions are not considered, we can assume that the ID queried to the Extract oracle satisfies H1(ID) = xe for some
x ∈ Z∗N and so x is a valid secret signing key because SK = H1(ID)d = (xe)d = xmod N where e · d = 1 mod φ(N). Next
we show that all signatures generated from the Ring-sign oracle are valid. The signature returned from the αth query
correctly passes the verification test because σ e =

σ eH1(IDs)−hs
∏n
i=1,i≠s R
−1
i H1(IDi)
−hi

H1(IDs)hs
∏n
i=1,i≠s Ri ·H1(IDi)hi =
RsH1(IDs)hs
∏n
i=1,i≠s Ri · H1(IDi)hi =
∏n
i=1 Ri · H1(IDi)hi . Similarly, signatures returned from signature queries with H1(ID) =
yxe mod N are valid because of the same reason above. For the otherRing-sign querieswithH1(ID) = xe mod N , generated
signatures are valid because the signatures are honestly generatedwith the signing key xwhichwas picked by the simulator.
For the forgery output byFI , we have two possible cases: (1) The first case is thatΘ is generated by a Ring-sign query.
(2) The second case is that the adversary generatesΘ by himself or with corrupted users, without the help of a Ring-sign
query. Next, for each case, we describe a method to solve the RSA problem and compute the success probability. In the
following description, for simplicity, we assume that all the identities IDi that the adversary queried to the Extract oracle
satisfy H(IDi) = xei (mod N). Using analysis similar to the proof of Theorem 4 in [3] we can show that this assumption
holds with overwhelming probability.
• In the first case, if Coinδ = 1 andΘ is the same as the signature returned from the αth Ring-sign ⟨ID,U,M⟩ query then
a solution to the given instance of the RSA problem can be computed as follows: if any IDi ≠ IDs, IDt exists in the ringU then
z = A′iA−1i is computed as the solution. It is easy to see that ze = (A′iA−1i )e = RiA−ei = yAei A−ei = y (mod N) and so z is the
correct solution. IfU = {IDs, IDt} then we have Rs = A′es (by the validity of cv-pf) and Rs = σ e · H1(IDt)−ht · H1(IDs)−hsR−1t
(by the construction of Θ). So we have A′es = σ e · H1(IDt)−ht · H1(IDs)−hsy−1A−et = σ e · (x−htt )e · (x−hss )ey−1A−et and
y = (A′−1s A−1t )e · σ e · (x−hss x−htt )e = (A′−1s A−1t σ x−htt x−hss )e, where H(IDt) = xhtt , H(IDs) = xhss , and ht = H2(U,M, IDt , Rt),
hs = H2(U,M, IDs, Rs). In this case, A′−1s A−1t σ x−htt x−hss is the desired solution to the RSA problem.
By assumption, the probability of Coinδ = 1 is 1/2. The probability of the correct choice for α is at least 1/Qs because α
is uniformly picked from {1, . . . ,Qs}. Therefore, the probability that the simulator succeeds is at least 12Qs .
Note that no abortion occurs in the simulation of Opening oracle queries if the Θ that FI outputs is the same as the
signature returned from the αth Ring-sign ⟨ID,U,M⟩ query.
• In the second case, if Coinδ = 0 then we can solve the RSA problem as follows. By assumption, Θ is valid and so we
have σ e = ∏ni=1 Ri · H1(IDi)hi mod N . Let γ = σ(∏ni=1,i≠t Aixhii )−1x−htt mod N where H(IDt) = yxet mod N . Then we have
γ e = Rtyht mod N because
γ e =
σ  n∏
i=1,i≠t
Aix
hi
i
−1
x−htt
e = σ e  n∏
i=1,i≠t
Aei (x
e
i )
hi
−1
(xet )
−ht
= σ e

n∏
i=1,i≠t
RiH1(IDi)hi
−1
(xet )
−ht
=
n∏
i=1
Ri · H1(IDi)hi

n∏
i=1,i≠t
RiH1(IDi)hi
−1
(xet )
−ht
= RtH1(IDt)ht (xet )−ht = Rt(yxet )ht (xet )−ht = Rtyht (mod N).
Using the ‘Forking Lemma’ [4] (or ‘Ring Forking Lemma’ [3]) technique, we can obtain another forgery (IDt ,U,M, Θˆ, cv-pf)
such that hj ≠ hˆj (j = 1, . . . , t − 1, t + 1, . . . , n) and ht ≠ hˆt , where Θˆ = (U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, hˆ1, . . . , hˆn, σˆ ) and
cv-pf=(t, A′1, . . . , A
′
t−1, A
′
t+1, . . . , A′n) satisfying (A
′
j)
e = Rj (mod N) for j ≠ t . Using a similar argument to γ , we can have
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γˆ such that γˆ e = Rtyhˆt mod N . Dividing the two equations, γ e = Rtyht mod N and γˆ e = Rtyhˆt mod N , we have (γ /γˆ )e =
yh mod N where h = ht − hˆt . Since ht and hˆt are outputs of the random hash oracle H2, we have |h| = |ht − hˆt | < 2ℓ < e. In
addition, e is a prime number and so gcd(e, h) = 1. Using the extended Euclidean algorithm we can find two integers a and
b such that ae + bh = 1. Let z = (γ /γˆ )b · ya mod N . It is easy to see that z is the solution of the given instance of the RSA
problem because ze = (γ /γˆ )eb · yea = ybh · yea = ymod N . Hence, we can construct an efficient solver to the RSA problem.
Since the probability of Coinδ = 0 is 1/2 by assumption, the probability that the simulator succeeds in the above case is
at least 12 .
Note that no abortion occurs in the simulation of Opening oracle queries if Coinδ = 0, because the simulator could
responds with a valid authorship proof to any Opening query as presented in the simulation of the Opening oracle. 
Lemma 2. An adversary FII has a negligible advantage in the second game for SV-unforgeability in Section 4.2
Proof. Wewill construct an efficient algorithm S to solve the RSA problem using an adversaryFII who attacks the proposed
scheme in the second game of SV-unforgeability. Let (N, e, y) be an instance of the RSA problem. The goal of S is to compute
z ∈ Z∗N such that ze = y (mod N). The solver S will simulate an attack environment for the adversary through oracle
queries. We assume that FII ’s hash queries are never repeated. Let Q1, Q2, Qe, and Qs be the numbers of H1, H2, Extract,
and Ring-sign queries issued by the adversary, respectively. We assume that all ring signatures to be queried to Opening
oracle are generated by the Ring-sign oracle.
S responds to oracle queries as follows.
• Queries to theH2 random hash oracle. These queries are trivially answered, that is, for an oracle query, pick c from {0, 1}ℓ
uniformly at random, and then return c .
• Queries to H1 random hash oracle. For an H1⟨ID⟩ oracle query, pick x ∈ Z∗N uniformly at random and compute v =
xe mod N , and then return the defined H1(ID) = v.
• Queries to the Extract oracle. For an Extract⟨ID⟩ query, if an H1(ID) query has not been queried to the H1 random
hash oracle then ask an H1(ID) query. Find the private signing key x corresponding to H1(ID) = v = xe mod N and then
return x.
• Queries to the Ring-sign oracle. When F makes a signature query for (ID,U,M), proceed as follows. Assume that
ID ∈ U = {ID1, . . . , IDn}. Find the private signing key SK = x corresponding to H(ID) = xe mod N . Using the secret
signing key, generate a signature according to the correct signing procedure and then return the signature.
• Queries to the Opening oracle. For any Opening query, a correct answer is returned because all signing keys are well
defined and signatures are honestly generated according to the defined signing procedure with the signing keys.
When the adversary submits (M,U, ID ∈ U) as a challenge in the challenge phase, the simulator S returns a ring signature
Θ as follows: let ID = IDs ∈ U = {ID1, . . . , IDn}.
(1) Find the private signing key SKs = xs corresponding to H(ID) = xes mod N .
(2) For each i = 1, . . . , n (i ≠ s), pick Ai ∈ Z∗N uniformly at random, pairwise different, and compute Ri = yAei mod N .
Compute hi ← H2(U,M, IDi, Ri) by querying ⟨U,M, IDi, Ri⟩ to the random hash oracle H2.
(3) Pick A ∈ Z∗N uniformly at random and compute Rs = y−(n−1) · Ae ·
∏n
i=1,i≠s H1(IDi)−hi mod N . Compute hs ←
H2(U,M, IDs, Rs) by querying ⟨U,M, IDs, Rs⟩ to the random oracle H2.
(4) Compute σ = SK hss · A ·
∏n
i=1,i≠s Ai mod N .
(5) ReturnΘ = (U,M, R1, . . . , Rn, h1, . . . , hn, σ ).
The signatureΘ is valid because
σ e =

SK hss · A ·
n∏
i=1,i≠s
Ai
e
= H1(IDs)hs · Ae
n∏
i=1,i≠s
Aei ·

n∏
i=1,i≠s
H1(IDi)−hiH1(IDi)hi

y−(n−1)yn−1
=

y−(n−1) · Ae ·
n∏
i=1,i≠s
H1(IDi)−hi

H1(IDs)hs
n∏
i=1,i≠s
yAei · H1(IDi)hi
= RsH1(IDs)hs
n∏
i=1,i≠s
Ri · H1(IDi)hi =
n∏
i=1
Ri · H1(IDi)hi (mod N).
Assume that FII finally outputs a valid (IDt ,Θ, cv-pf) where IDt is the real signer of Θ and cv-pf = (t, A′1, . . . , A′t−1,
A′t+1, . . . , A′n). Since cv-pf is valid, A
′e
i = Ri for each i = 1, . . . , n (i ≠ t). If there exists IDi ∈ U which is not equal
to any of IDt and IDs then the simulator computes z = A′iA−1i (mod N) and outputs z as the solution to the given
instance of the RSA problem. It is easy to see that ze = (A′iA−1i )e = RiA−ei = yAei A−ei = y (mod N) and so z is the
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correct solution. If the ring U contains only two identities IDs and IDt , i.e., U = {IDs, IDt} then we have Rs = A′es by the
validity of cv-pf and Rs = y−1 · Ae · H1(IDt)−ht by the construction of Θ . So we have A′es = y−1 · Ae · H1(IDt)−ht and
y = (A′−1s )e · Ae · (x−htt )e = (A′−1s Ax−htt )e, where H(IDt) = xhtt and ht = H2(U,M, IDt , Rt). In this case, the simulator outputs
A′−1s Ax
−ht
t (mod N) as the desired solution.
The given simulation is perfect because all signing keys are correctly generated by the simulator and distributed
identically as in the proposed Extract algorithm. Hence, the success probability of the RSA-solver S is the same as that
of the adversary FII . 
Remark 1. Alternatively, to prove Lemma 2, the proof idea of Theorem 7 in [3] is directly applicable. However, our method
is more natural and can avoid ‘‘FALSIFYING" the H2 random oracle because Rs is computed with the private key of the target
signer and then hs ← H2(U,M, IDs, Rs) is computed by asking (U,M, IDs, Rs) to the random oracle H2.
5. Conclusion
We have shown that the IBRS scheme with signer verifiability recently proposed by [3] is vulnerable to a key recovery
attack. Additionally, we have presented a simple method to fix this security problem.
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